Remove ?token= deletion-token path (#143)
The deletion token was accepted via the ?token= query parameter on both
DELETE /api/pastes/{id} and /redeem, and round-tripped through the paste
URL after creation. URL-carried bearer secrets leak into reverse-proxy
access logs and browser history.
- API: deletion tokens are now accepted only via the Authorization header
(Bearer/Token/bare); query params are ignored on both endpoints
- Web create flow: token moves to the browser via a short-lived tok_<id>
HttpOnly cookie instead of the redirect URL; the paste view reads it
from the cookie, never from ?token=
- Web view: the delete button calls redeem() which takes the token from
sessionStorage and sends it as an Authorization header
- Tests: correct token in query must be rejected (403/400); header path
still deletes/redeems; extraction unit cases updated
Fixes #143
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@@ -291,7 +291,9 @@ function finishCreate(data) {
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setTimeout(() => { copyBtn.classList.remove('ok'); copyBtn.textContent = '⧉'; }, 2000);
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} catch(e) { toast('Copy failed', 'error'); }
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});
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const dest = '/' + data.id + '?created=1&token=' + encodeURIComponent(data.deletion_token || '');
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// token carried via sessionStorage, never in the URL (#143)
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const dest = '/' + data.id + '?created=1';
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try { sessionStorage.setItem('deletion_token_' + data.id, data.deletion_token || ''); } catch(e) {}
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// password-protected: unlock now with the password we already have (#26)
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if ($('haspw').checked && data.id) {
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const fd = new FormData();
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