fix #280: key rate-limit buckets on peer address, not client XFF

The deployed ingress does not append the peer to X-Forwarded-For, so the rightmost XFF entry was fully client-controlled and rotating the header gave a fresh rate-limit bucket per request (pentest: 8 creates, 6x201). clientIP() now defaults to the peer (RemoteAddr) and never trusts client-supplied headers. Per-client granularity is restored opt-in via PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER, honored only when the immediate peer is inside PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES (default loopback + RFC1918) and the value parses as an IP.
2026-09-17 20:34:59 -05:00
parent 70b06db192
commit a0b34378a4
2 changed files with 166 additions and 75 deletions
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 package api

 import (
+	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"os"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -48,33 +50,72 @@ func (l *limiter) allow(key string, rate, burst float64) bool {
 	return true
 }

-// clientIP extracts the client IP for rate-limit keying (#85).
+// clientIP extracts the client IP for rate-limit keying (#85, #280).
 //
-// Trust boundary: palette runs behind exactly ONE trusted reverse proxy
-// (Traefik in the k3s pod network). Traefik APPENDS the real client IP to
-// X-Forwarded-For, so the RIGHTMOST entry is the last value the trusted
-// proxy observed and is unspoofable by the client (a client-supplied fake
-// entry only lands on the LEFT and is ignored). This matches chi's
-// middleware.RealIP semantics for a single trusted proxy hop.
+// Trust boundary (revised in #280): the deployed ingress does NOT append the
+// peer address to X-Forwarded-For, so every XFF entry (and X-Real-Ip) is
+// client-controlled. Keying on any client-supplied header lets an attacker
+// rotate the header per request and get a fresh rate-limit bucket every
+// time. The bucket key therefore defaults to the PEER address (RemoteAddr),
+// which the client cannot influence.
 //
-// Direct connections (no XFF header) fall back to RemoteAddr. Directly
-// reachable deployments must NOT expose the app to untrusted networks
-// without a proxy in front, or attackers could forge the rightmost entry.
+// Deployments that pin their proxy chain can restore per-client granularity:
+// set PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER (e.g. "CF-Connecting-IP" once the proxy chain
+// is pinned, e.g. Traefik forwardedHeaders.trustedIPs limited to Cloudflare
+// ranges or an origin firewall locked to CF) and the header value is honored
+// ONLY when the immediate peer (RemoteAddr) is inside PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES
+// (default: loopback + RFC1918 private ranges, i.e. the in-cluster Traefik
+// hop). A public peer never triggers header trust, and the header value must
+// parse as an IP.
 func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
-	if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
-		if i := strings.LastIndex(xff, ","); i >= 0 {
-			return strings.TrimSpace(xff[i+1:])
+	peer := hostOnly(r.RemoteAddr)
+	if hdr := os.Getenv("PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER"); hdr != "" && trustedProxy(peer) {
+		if v := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get(hdr)); net.ParseIP(v) != nil {
+			return v
 		}
-		return strings.TrimSpace(xff)
 	}
-	if xr := r.Header.Get("X-Real-Ip"); xr != "" {
-		return strings.TrimSpace(xr)
+	return peer
+}
+
+// trustedProxy reports whether peer (an IP without port) falls inside any of
+// the configured trusted proxy CIDRs (PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES, default
+// loopback + RFC1918 private ranges). Parsed once and cached.
+func trustedProxy(peer string) bool {
+	trustedOnce.Do(func() {
+		spec := os.Getenv("PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES")
+		if strings.TrimSpace(spec) == "" {
+			spec = "127.0.0.0/8,::1/128,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16"
 		}
-	host := r.RemoteAddr
-	if i := strings.LastIndex(host, ":"); i > 0 {
-		host = host[:i]
+		for _, c := range strings.Split(spec, ",") {
+			if _, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(strings.TrimSpace(c)); err == nil {
+				trustedCIDRs = append(trustedCIDRs, cidr)
 			}
-	return host
+		}
+	})
+	ip := net.ParseIP(peer)
+	if ip == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, cidr := range trustedCIDRs {
+		if cidr.Contains(ip) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+var (
+	trustedOnce  sync.Once
+	trustedCIDRs []*net.IPNet
+)
+
+// hostOnly strips the port from a host:port address.
+func hostOnly(addr string) string {
+	host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		host = addr
+	}
+	return strings.TrimSpace(host)
 }

 var globalLimiter = newLimiter()
@@ -1,85 +1,135 @@
 package api

-// Issue #85: the rate limit key must use the rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry
-// (appended by the trusted Traefik proxy), never the raw/leftmost header
-// value a client can forge. A spoofed FIRST XFF entry must not bypass the
-// limit or rotate buckets.
+// Issues #85 + #280: the rate limit bucket key must NEVER be derived from a
+// client-controlled header. The deployed ingress does not append the peer
+// address to X-Forwarded-For, so every XFF entry is attacker-controlled and
+// an attacker can rotate the header per request to get a fresh bucket. The
+// key defaults to the peer (RemoteAddr); an opt-in trusted header is honored
+// only when the immediate peer is a trusted proxy.

 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"sync"
 	"testing"
 )

-func TestClientIPTakesRightmostXFF(t *testing.T) {
-	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
-	r.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000" // trusted Traefik pod
-	r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 1.2.3.5, 203.0.113.9")
-	if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.9" {
-		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want rightmost 203.0.113.9", got)
-	}
+// resetTrustedProxyCache clears the sync.Once-cached CIDR list so each test
+// re-parses PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES under its own env.
+func resetTrustedProxyCache(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		trustedOnce = sync.Once{}
+		trustedCIDRs = nil
+	})
+	trustedOnce = sync.Once{}
+	trustedCIDRs = nil
 }

-func TestClientIPXRealIPFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
-	r.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
-	r.Header.Set("X-Real-Ip", "203.0.113.10")
-	if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.10" {
-		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.10", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientIPDirectFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
-	r.RemoteAddr = "198.51.100.5:51000"
-	if got := clientIP(r); got != "198.51.100.5" {
-		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 198.51.100.5", got)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRateLimitSpoofedFirstXFFDoesNotBypass: an attacker rotating a fake
-// leftmost XFF entry stays limited on their real (rightmost) IP.
-func TestRateLimitSpoofedFirstXFFDoesNotBypass(t *testing.T) {
+// Rotating XFF must not create fresh buckets: all requests share the peer's
+// bucket. This is the #280 pentest repro (8 creates, 6x201 before the fix).
+func TestRateLimitRotatingXFFSharesPeerBucket(t *testing.T) {
 	srv := newTestServer(t)
 	h := srv.routes()
-	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
+	codes := []int{}
+	for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
 		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
-		req.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
-		// each request spoofs a DIFFERENT leftmost entry
-		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", spoofN(i)+", 203.0.113.9")
+		req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:51000" // public peer
+		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "9.9.9."+string(rune('0'+i)))
 		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
 		h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
-		if rr.Code != 201 {
-			t.Fatalf("req %d: want 201, got %d", i, rr.Code)
+		codes = append(codes, rr.Code)
+	}
+	allowed := 0
+	for _, c := range codes {
+		if c == 201 {
+			allowed++
 		}
 	}
-	// 6th request, still the same real IP, new spoofed prefix: must 429
+	if allowed > 5 {
+		t.Fatalf("rotating XFF bypassed the limit: allowed=%d codes=%v", allowed, codes)
+	}
+	// and the no-header bucket is the SAME bucket: fully exhausted
 	req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
-	req.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
-	req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.9")
+	req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:51000"
 	rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
 	if rr.Code != 429 {
-		t.Fatalf("spoofed 6th req: want 429, got %d", rr.Code)
+		t.Fatalf("no-header request after rotating XFF: want 429, got %d", rr.Code)
 	}
 }

-func spoofN(i int) string {
-	return "1.2.3." + string(rune('0'+i))
+// clientIP unit checks.
+func TestClientIPIgnoresClientHeadersByDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
+	r.RemoteAddr = "198.51.100.5:51000"
+	r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8")
+	r.Header.Set("X-Real-Ip", "9.9.9.9")
+	if got := clientIP(r); got != "198.51.100.5" {
+		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 198.51.100.5", got)
+	}
 }

-// Distinct real IPs must still get distinct buckets (no over-limiting).
-func TestRateLimitDistinctRightmostIPsIndependent(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := newTestServer(t)
-	h := srv.routes()
-	for _, ip := range []string{"203.0.113.20", "203.0.113.21"} {
-		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
-		req.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
-		req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "6.6.6.6, "+ip)
-		rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
-		h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
-		if rr.Code != 201 {
-			t.Fatalf("ip %s: want 201, got %d", ip, rr.Code)
+// Opt-in trusted header: honored only from a trusted private peer and only
+// with a parseable IP value.
+func TestClientIPTrustedHeaderFromPrivatePeer(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER", "Cf-Connecting-Ip")
+	// reset the cached CIDR parse (sync.Once) for a clean run
+	resetTrustedProxyCache(t)
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
+	r.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000" // in-cluster proxy hop
+	r.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "203.0.113.42")
+	if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.42" {
+		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.42", got)
+	}
+	// same header from a PUBLIC peer must be ignored (peer not trusted)
+	r2 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
+	r2.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:51000"
+	r2.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "6.6.6.6")
+	if got := clientIP(r2); got != "203.0.113.9" {
+		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 203.0.113.9 (untrusted peer)", got)
+	}
+	// garbage header value must be ignored
+	r3 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
+	r3.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
+	r3.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "not-an-ip; 6.6.6.6")
+	if got := clientIP(r3); got != "10.42.0.7" {
+		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 10.42.0.7 (bad header value)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// Custom trusted proxy CIDR list is honored.
+func TestClientIPCustomTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER", "Cf-Connecting-Ip")
+	t.Setenv("PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "192.168.50.0/24")
+	resetTrustedProxyCache(t)
+
+	r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
+	r.RemoteAddr = "192.168.50.10:51000"
+	r.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "203.0.113.77")
+	if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.77" {
+		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.77", got)
+	}
+	// outside the custom list
+	r2 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
+	r2.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
+	r2.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "203.0.113.77")
+	if got := clientIP(r2); got != "10.42.0.7" {
+		t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 10.42.0.7 (outside custom trusted list)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// IPv6 peer without port must not be mangled.
+func TestHostOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := map[string]string{
+		"198.51.100.5:51000": "198.51.100.5",
+		"[2001:db8::1]:8080": "2001:db8::1",
+		"198.51.100.5":       "198.51.100.5",
+	}
+	for in, want := range cases {
+		if got := hostOnly(in); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("hostOnly(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
 		}
 	}
 }