security headers middleware: CSP, Referrer-Policy, nosniff on HTML pages (#59)
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- web.SecurityHeaders middleware wired into the chi router
- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' (page scripts are inline); frame-ancestors 'none'
- Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- Applied only to text/html responses; JSON API and /raw pass through unchanged
- Regression test internal/web/securityheaders_test.go
This commit is contained in:
palette-agent
2026-09-09 09:16:42 -05:00
parent 03bf327f6b
commit e08cafe9c8
3 changed files with 77 additions and 0 deletions
+20
View File
@@ -290,3 +290,23 @@ func (h *Handlers) HandleAdminPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Handlers builds a web.Handlers bound to this UI.
func (u *UI) Handlers() *Handlers { return &Handlers{UI: u} }
// #59: security headers for rendered HTML pages. Applied wherever the
// response is text/html (page templates and the inline can page); JSON API
// responses and /raw content pass through untouched. script-src allows
// 'unsafe-inline' because the page templates carry inline scripts; CSP
// default-src 'self' still blocks external content and object/frame embeds,
// and frame-ancestors 'none' closes the clickjacking gap flagged in the #34
// pentest. Runs after the handler so the Content-Type is already set.
func SecurityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
h := w.Header()
if strings.HasPrefix(h.Get("Content-Type"), "text/html") {
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy",
"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; frame-ancestors 'none'")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "no-referrer")
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
}
})
}