2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
fen aac1725c25 #280: remove PALETTE_TRUSTED_IP_HEADER, key rate limits on peer address only
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Owner follow-up to the #280 fix (PR #284): the trusted-header env var is
gone. clientIP() now uses the peer address exclusively and ignores all
client-supplied IP headers; the env var row is removed from the README.
2026-09-17 20:48:52 -05:00
fen f63efc6d88 Fix rate limiter bypass via client-controlled X-Forwarded-For (#280)
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 25s
CI / docker (pull_request) Skipped
clientIP() keyed rate-limit buckets on the rightmost X-Forwarded-For
entry, assuming traefik appends the real client IP. The deployed ingress
does not rewrite XFF, so rotating the header gave a fresh bucket per
request (pentest H1: 8 creates with rotating XFF -> 6x201).

Now the bucket keys on the actual peer address (RemoteAddr) by default;
every client-supplied IP header is ignored. Deployments whose ingress
overwrites a client-IP header can opt in via PALETTE_TRUSTED_IP_HEADER
(e.g. CF-Connecting-IP behind Cloudflare) to restore per-client limits.

Adds tests: rotating XFF no longer resets the bucket; the trusted header
is honored only when explicitly configured.
2026-09-17 20:29:40 -05:00