The deletion token was accepted via the ?token= query parameter on both
DELETE /api/pastes/{id} and /redeem, and round-tripped through the paste
URL after creation. URL-carried bearer secrets leak into reverse-proxy
access logs and browser history.
- API: deletion tokens are now accepted only via the Authorization header
(Bearer/Token/bare); query params are ignored on both endpoints
- Web create flow: token moves to the browser via a short-lived tok_<id>
HttpOnly cookie instead of the redirect URL; the paste view reads it
from the cookie, never from ?token=
- Web view: the delete button calls redeem() which takes the token from
sessionStorage and sends it as an Authorization header
- Tests: correct token in query must be rejected (403/400); header path
still deletes/redeems; extraction unit cases updated
Fixes#143
- DELETE now demands the create-time deletion token (Authorization
header: Bearer/Token/bare, or ?token= query param), compared with
the constant-time store.DeletionTokenEqual. 403 otherwise.
- Creator-browser deletes via the /mine button (matching vwr cookie,
#37) remain allowed; other browsers and plain API clients get 403.
- Regression tests: no token, wrong token (header+query), correct
token (header+query), creator-cookie path, token extraction.
- Adapted TestSoftDelete to pass the deletion token.
- docs/API.md delete section updated.
- Based on #58's SoftDelete (bool, error) signature.