Merge pull request 'ratelimit: rightmost untrusted-hop-safe client IP (fixes #85)' (#89) from fix-85-xff into main
This commit was merged in pull request #89.
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@@ -48,8 +48,28 @@ func (l *limiter) allow(key string, rate, burst float64) bool {
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return true
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return true
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}
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}
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// clientIP extracts the request IP (no reverse proxy header by default).
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// clientIP extracts the client IP for rate-limit keying (#85).
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//
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// Trust boundary: palette runs behind exactly ONE trusted reverse proxy
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// (Traefik in the k3s pod network). Traefik APPENDS the real client IP to
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// X-Forwarded-For, so the RIGHTMOST entry is the last value the trusted
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// proxy observed and is unspoofable by the client (a client-supplied fake
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// entry only lands on the LEFT and is ignored). This matches chi's
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// middleware.RealIP semantics for a single trusted proxy hop.
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//
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// Direct connections (no XFF header) fall back to RemoteAddr. Directly
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// reachable deployments must NOT expose the app to untrusted networks
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// without a proxy in front, or attackers could forge the rightmost entry.
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func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
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func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
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if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
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if i := strings.LastIndex(xff, ","); i >= 0 {
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return strings.TrimSpace(xff[i+1:])
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}
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return strings.TrimSpace(xff)
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}
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if xr := r.Header.Get("X-Real-Ip"); xr != "" {
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return strings.TrimSpace(xr)
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}
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host := r.RemoteAddr
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host := r.RemoteAddr
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if i := strings.LastIndex(host, ":"); i > 0 {
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if i := strings.LastIndex(host, ":"); i > 0 {
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host = host[:i]
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host = host[:i]
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@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
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package api
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// Issue #85: the rate limit key must use the rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry
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// (appended by the trusted Traefik proxy), never the raw/leftmost header
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// value a client can forge. A spoofed FIRST XFF entry must not bypass the
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// limit or rotate buckets.
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import (
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"bytes"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestClientIPTakesRightmostXFF(t *testing.T) {
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r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000" // trusted Traefik pod
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r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 1.2.3.5, 203.0.113.9")
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if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.9" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want rightmost 203.0.113.9", got)
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}
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}
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func TestClientIPXRealIPFallback(t *testing.T) {
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r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
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r.Header.Set("X-Real-Ip", "203.0.113.10")
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if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.10" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.10", got)
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}
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}
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func TestClientIPDirectFallback(t *testing.T) {
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r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "198.51.100.5:51000"
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if got := clientIP(r); got != "198.51.100.5" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 198.51.100.5", got)
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}
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}
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// TestRateLimitSpoofedFirstXFFDoesNotBypass: an attacker rotating a fake
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// leftmost XFF entry stays limited on their real (rightmost) IP.
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func TestRateLimitSpoofedFirstXFFDoesNotBypass(t *testing.T) {
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srv := newTestServer(t)
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h := srv.routes()
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for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
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req.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
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// each request spoofs a DIFFERENT leftmost entry
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", spoofN(i)+", 203.0.113.9")
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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if rr.Code != 201 {
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t.Fatalf("req %d: want 201, got %d", i, rr.Code)
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}
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}
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// 6th request, still the same real IP, new spoofed prefix: must 429
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
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req.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.9")
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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if rr.Code != 429 {
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t.Fatalf("spoofed 6th req: want 429, got %d", rr.Code)
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}
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}
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func spoofN(i int) string {
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return "1.2.3." + string(rune('0'+i))
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}
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// Distinct real IPs must still get distinct buckets (no over-limiting).
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func TestRateLimitDistinctRightmostIPsIndependent(t *testing.T) {
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srv := newTestServer(t)
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h := srv.routes()
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for _, ip := range []string{"203.0.113.20", "203.0.113.21"} {
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
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req.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "6.6.6.6, "+ip)
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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if rr.Code != 201 {
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t.Fatalf("ip %s: want 201, got %d", ip, rr.Code)
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}
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}
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}
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