t.colors was removed by #113; rendering threw on first iteration and
the theme grid rendered empty. Use the colors returned by
presetColors(t.id) instead. Verified in headless chromium: 5
theme-card elements render on /settings.
- Backend create/can validation paths emit machine-readable error codes
(slug_taken, slug_invalid, content_empty, content_too_large,
expiry_invalid, rate_limited, ...) alongside the human message
- new.html JS maps codes to plain-language guidance with generic fallback
- Result card colored via --ok/--err/--warn left border (result-ok/err/warn)
- docs/API.md error section documents the code field
- Tests assert the code on every validation path
Arrow is absolutely positioned at left:8px in the th, label padding-left
24px; translateY(-50%) keeps it centered regardless of row height, and
being out of flow the label never moves between sorted/unsorted states.
Panel was already display:none-gated until auth; tightened so a wrong
submitted key is never stored in sessionStorage — the typed key is
validated via the settings API first, and only persisted on 200.
SoftDelete now reports whether it performed the delete (conditional
UPDATE ... WHERE deleted_at IS NULL checked via RowsAffected).
RegisterRead returns an admitted flag: legacy burn pastes admit exactly
one reader (the atomic soft-delete winner), and burn-after-N pastes
increment reads_used via a conditional UPDATE guarded on
reads_used < reads_limit, so concurrent readers cannot both consume the
final read. API, HTML, and raw read paths return 404 when the reader
loses the burn claim; content is never served twice.
OpenStore pins the SQLite pool to one connection: concurrent writes on
separate pooled connections surfaced SQLITE_BUSY as spurious 500s
instead of serializing.
Adds concurrency regression tests: 24 parallel readers of a burn paste
(exactly one receives content, none of the others leak it) and 30
parallel readers vs a 3-read budget (exactly 3 admitted, then 404).
- web.SecurityHeaders middleware wired into the chi router
- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' (page scripts are inline); frame-ancestors 'none'
- Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- Applied only to text/html responses; JSON API and /raw pass through unchanged
- Regression test internal/web/securityheaders_test.go
- Fix filter fetch to request limit=100 (API max) instead of 500, which
the API silently clamped, so filtered results actually cover the fetch window.
- Document client-side filtering behavior and limits in README Performance Notes.
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