Commit Graph
30 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
fen d44e4d1587 Merge pull request 'Secrets via headers only: drop ?key= and ?password= query fallbacks (#137, #141)' (#150) from fix-137-141-drop-query-secrets into dev
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2026-09-10 04:23:27 +00:00
fen d013f3965f Require secrets via headers only: drop ?key= and ?password= query fallbacks (#137, #141)
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Query strings leak into Traefik access logs, browser history, and Referer
headers. Admin key is now accepted only via X-Admin-Key; paste and can
passwords only via X-Paste-Password (or the POST unlock form). Tests
updated; new negative cases assert 401 for the query paths.
2026-09-09 23:23:10 -05:00
fen 4948ef9f1c #38 iteration 1: file attachments, 1 file per paste
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- internal/store/blob.go: BlobStore interface + fs implementation with
  traversal-safe keys (<paste-id>/<sha256>), put/get/stat/delete
- attachments table migration (id, paste_id, filename sanitized to 255,
  mime sniffed server-side, size, sha256, created_at)
- POST /api/pastes now accepts multipart/form-data with a 'file' part;
  1 file = 1 paste: file replaces text content when both are sent
- 25 MB per-file limit enforced server-side (413 file_too_large)
- GET /f/{attachment-id}/{filename}: stored sniffed mime, nosniff,
  inline only for images/pdf, html/svg/xml forced to text/plain (#34 rule)
- paste view renders attachment chip + inline image preview
- /new: dropzone with file picker, drag-and-drop, Ctrl+V file paste,
  file chip with name/size/remove, matches pill/radius design
- tests: blob roundtrip/traversal/sanitize; multipart create (mime
  sniffing, client mime ignored, size limit, two-file reject, html/svg
  forcing, 404s, password/expiry fields)
2026-09-09 22:21:15 -05:00
poslop f37cc932c4 store: burn_after_reads>0 implies burn-after-read mode (#82)
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2026-09-09 18:28:00 -05:00
poslop 9df6224a27 Result box: color-code by status + friendly error messages from error codes (#105)
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- Backend create/can validation paths emit machine-readable error codes
  (slug_taken, slug_invalid, content_empty, content_too_large,
  expiry_invalid, rate_limited, ...) alongside the human message
- new.html JS maps codes to plain-language guidance with generic fallback
- Result card colored via --ok/--err/--warn left border (result-ok/err/warn)
- docs/API.md error section documents the code field
- Tests assert the code on every validation path
2026-09-09 17:28:25 -05:00
poslop b21be29daa minor fixes: version label (#93), view dedupe tests (#95) 2026-09-09 16:40:53 -05:00
poslop cd70dd0b0e Merge origin/main (license, compose, #65 leak guard) into cans work
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2026-09-09 16:39:14 -05:00
poslop 5b9be808ed Merge origin/main: keep can listing rows with #65 password-metadata leak guard 2026-09-09 16:36:55 -05:00
poslop 19804d47a3 Cans UI + parity: unlock-cookie flow, /can page, listings badge, custom slug, delete, sweeper; #32 perf notes (#4, #32) 2026-09-09 16:34:51 -05:00
poslop 959a83be1e Merge pull request 'Bound title and language at create time (#86)' (#91) from fix-86-field-bounds into main
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2026-09-09 15:59:32 +00:00
poslop 5b068faf8f Merge pull request 'ratelimit: rightmost untrusted-hop-safe client IP (fixes #85)' (#89) from fix-85-xff into main
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2026-09-09 15:59:29 +00:00
poslop b0360af79c Merge pull request 'Fix #83: create API ignores boolean public field' (#88) from fix-83-public-false into main
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2026-09-09 15:59:26 +00:00
fen 389e4d333f Bound title and language at create time (#86)
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Titles are trimmed and truncated to 200 characters; language must be
blank or match ^[a-zA-Z0-9+#-]{1,40}$ (max 40 chars) or the create is
rejected with a clear 400. Regression tests cover truncation, malformed
and oversized language values, valid identifiers, and blank metadata.
2026-09-09 10:58:34 -05:00
fen 99a044e8a2 Rate-limit all password verification attempts (#81)
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GET ?password= and X-Paste-Password header checks in handleGetPaste were
unlimited (pentest2: 8 wrong = 8x401, no 429). Gate every password
verification on the same per-IP+paste unlock limiter (5/min, 429 with
Retry-After) already used by the POST unlock form path.

Regression tests: repeated wrong passwords via GET ?password= and via
header must eventually 429; correct password within burst still 200.

Fixes #81
2026-09-09 10:58:21 -05:00
agent 3d1d5ee1fd ratelimit: key on rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry (fixes #85)
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2026-09-09 10:57:59 -05:00
Hermes Agent ccb22a2d28 #83: accept boolean public field in create API (false->unlisted, true->public)
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2026-09-09 10:57:56 -05:00
poslop 91dbf6f344 Merge pull request 'fix: input validation gaps (#68)' (#78) from issue-68-input-validation into main
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2026-09-09 14:26:19 +00:00
poslop b600cdf51a Merge pull request 'Admin key endpoint: per-IP rate limiting and lockout (#66)' (#73) from issue-66-admin-ratelimit into main
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2026-09-09 14:26:13 +00:00
poslop 47c9fa6386 Merge pull request 'Clamp expires_in at API boundary (#60)' (#74) from issue-60-expiry-clamp into main
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2026-09-09 14:26:07 +00:00
poslop b7d1119d6d Merge pull request 'docs: design for optional client-side E2E encryption (issue #39)' (#75) from issue-39-e2e-design into main
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2026-09-09 14:26:02 +00:00
poslop 44fe3c5772 Merge pull request 'Security headers middleware: CSP, Referrer-Policy, nosniff (#59)' (#76) from issue-59-security-headers into main
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2026-09-09 14:26:01 +00:00
poslop 91568c0598 fix #63: require deletion token on DELETE /api/pastes/{id}
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- DELETE now demands the create-time deletion token (Authorization
  header: Bearer/Token/bare, or ?token= query param), compared with
  the constant-time store.DeletionTokenEqual. 403 otherwise.
- Creator-browser deletes via the /mine button (matching vwr cookie,
  #37) remain allowed; other browsers and plain API clients get 403.
- Regression tests: no token, wrong token (header+query), correct
  token (header+query), creator-cookie path, token extraction.
- Adapted TestSoftDelete to pass the deletion token.
- docs/API.md delete section updated.
- Based on #58's SoftDelete (bool, error) signature.
2026-09-09 09:21:28 -05:00
agent 94a4a3c2ec fix: input validation gaps (#68)
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- enforce server-side body cap via http.MaxBytesReader: oversized JSON
  bodies are rejected with 413 instead of being fully decoded first
- negative burn_after_reads rejected with 400 (zero still = default 1)
- limit=0 explicitly maps to default page size; shared parseLimit clamp
  for /api/public and /api/mine (huge/non-numeric values too)
- negative/non-numeric offset clamped to 0 via parseOffset (was
  pass-through)
- regression tests in issue68_validation_test.go

expires_at/expires_in validation intentionally excluded: covered by #60.
2026-09-09 09:21:25 -05:00
agent 78374b2d49 fix: atomic burn-after-read claim (#58)
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SoftDelete now reports whether it performed the delete (conditional
UPDATE ... WHERE deleted_at IS NULL checked via RowsAffected).
RegisterRead returns an admitted flag: legacy burn pastes admit exactly
one reader (the atomic soft-delete winner), and burn-after-N pastes
increment reads_used via a conditional UPDATE guarded on
reads_used < reads_limit, so concurrent readers cannot both consume the
final read. API, HTML, and raw read paths return 404 when the reader
loses the burn claim; content is never served twice.

OpenStore pins the SQLite pool to one connection: concurrent writes on
separate pooled connections surfaced SQLITE_BUSY as spurious 500s
instead of serializing.

Adds concurrency regression tests: 24 parallel readers of a burn paste
(exactly one receives content, none of the others leak it) and 30
parallel readers vs a 3-read budget (exactly 3 admitted, then 404).
2026-09-09 09:18:42 -05:00
palette-agent e08cafe9c8 security headers middleware: CSP, Referrer-Policy, nosniff on HTML pages (#59)
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- web.SecurityHeaders middleware wired into the chi router
- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' (page scripts are inline); frame-ancestors 'none'
- Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- Applied only to text/html responses; JSON API and /raw pass through unchanged
- Regression test internal/web/securityheaders_test.go
2026-09-09 09:16:42 -05:00
fen bb5c4f0186 fix #60: apply ValidExpiry clamp to cans create handler (was lost in working tree)
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2026-09-09 09:15:39 -05:00
palette-agent 9811191648 admin: per-IP rate limit (5/min) on admin key attempts (#66)
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2026-09-09 09:15:01 -05:00
Hermes Agent f6c4342468 Exclude password-protected pastes from public listings (#65)
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ListPublic and its COUNT query now filter password_hash IS NULL, so
/api/public (and any page backed by it) no longer leaks metadata
(title, slug, existence) of password-protected pastes. Unlisted
pastes were already excluded. Adds regression test covering both.
2026-09-09 09:13:26 -05:00
poslop f611cc3e9e fix #60: clamp expires_in on cans API (400 on zero/negative, cap 1yr) 2026-09-09 09:13:21 -05:00
poslop 4f1e901f04 Refactor: split monolith into cmd/palette + internal/{store,api,web,lang} (#35)
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2026-09-09 01:33:39 -05:00