Titles are trimmed and truncated to 200 characters; language must be
blank or match ^[a-zA-Z0-9+#-]{1,40}$ (max 40 chars) or the create is
rejected with a clear 400. Regression tests cover truncation, malformed
and oversized language values, valid identifiers, and blank metadata.
GET ?password= and X-Paste-Password header checks in handleGetPaste were
unlimited (pentest2: 8 wrong = 8x401, no 429). Gate every password
verification on the same per-IP+paste unlock limiter (5/min, 429 with
Retry-After) already used by the POST unlock form path.
Regression tests: repeated wrong passwords via GET ?password= and via
header must eventually 429; correct password within burst still 200.
Fixes#81
- DELETE now demands the create-time deletion token (Authorization
header: Bearer/Token/bare, or ?token= query param), compared with
the constant-time store.DeletionTokenEqual. 403 otherwise.
- Creator-browser deletes via the /mine button (matching vwr cookie,
#37) remain allowed; other browsers and plain API clients get 403.
- Regression tests: no token, wrong token (header+query), correct
token (header+query), creator-cookie path, token extraction.
- Adapted TestSoftDelete to pass the deletion token.
- docs/API.md delete section updated.
- Based on #58's SoftDelete (bool, error) signature.
- enforce server-side body cap via http.MaxBytesReader: oversized JSON
bodies are rejected with 413 instead of being fully decoded first
- negative burn_after_reads rejected with 400 (zero still = default 1)
- limit=0 explicitly maps to default page size; shared parseLimit clamp
for /api/public and /api/mine (huge/non-numeric values too)
- negative/non-numeric offset clamped to 0 via parseOffset (was
pass-through)
- regression tests in issue68_validation_test.go
expires_at/expires_in validation intentionally excluded: covered by #60.
SoftDelete now reports whether it performed the delete (conditional
UPDATE ... WHERE deleted_at IS NULL checked via RowsAffected).
RegisterRead returns an admitted flag: legacy burn pastes admit exactly
one reader (the atomic soft-delete winner), and burn-after-N pastes
increment reads_used via a conditional UPDATE guarded on
reads_used < reads_limit, so concurrent readers cannot both consume the
final read. API, HTML, and raw read paths return 404 when the reader
loses the burn claim; content is never served twice.
OpenStore pins the SQLite pool to one connection: concurrent writes on
separate pooled connections surfaced SQLITE_BUSY as spurious 500s
instead of serializing.
Adds concurrency regression tests: 24 parallel readers of a burn paste
(exactly one receives content, none of the others leak it) and 30
parallel readers vs a 3-read budget (exactly 3 admitted, then 404).
- web.SecurityHeaders middleware wired into the chi router
- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' (page scripts are inline); frame-ancestors 'none'
- Referrer-Policy: no-referrer, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- Applied only to text/html responses; JSON API and /raw pass through unchanged
- Regression test internal/web/securityheaders_test.go
ListPublic and its COUNT query now filter password_hash IS NULL, so
/api/public (and any page backed by it) no longer leaks metadata
(title, slug, existence) of password-protected pastes. Unlisted
pastes were already excluded. Adds regression test covering both.
poslop
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