The deployed ingress does not append the peer to X-Forwarded-For, so the rightmost XFF entry was fully client-controlled and rotating the header gave a fresh rate-limit bucket per request (pentest: 8 creates, 6x201). clientIP() now defaults to the peer (RemoteAddr) and never trusts client-supplied headers. Per-client granularity is restored opt-in via PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER, honored only when the immediate peer is inside PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES (default loopback + RFC1918) and the value parses as an IP.
136 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
136 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
package api
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// Issues #85 + #280: the rate limit bucket key must NEVER be derived from a
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// client-controlled header. The deployed ingress does not append the peer
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// address to X-Forwarded-For, so every XFF entry is attacker-controlled and
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// an attacker can rotate the header per request to get a fresh bucket. The
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// key defaults to the peer (RemoteAddr); an opt-in trusted header is honored
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// only when the immediate peer is a trusted proxy.
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import (
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"bytes"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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)
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// resetTrustedProxyCache clears the sync.Once-cached CIDR list so each test
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// re-parses PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES under its own env.
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func resetTrustedProxyCache(t *testing.T) {
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t.Helper()
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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trustedOnce = sync.Once{}
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trustedCIDRs = nil
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})
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trustedOnce = sync.Once{}
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trustedCIDRs = nil
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}
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// Rotating XFF must not create fresh buckets: all requests share the peer's
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// bucket. This is the #280 pentest repro (8 creates, 6x201 before the fix).
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func TestRateLimitRotatingXFFSharesPeerBucket(t *testing.T) {
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srv := newTestServer(t)
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h := srv.routes()
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codes := []int{}
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for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
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req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:51000" // public peer
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "9.9.9."+string(rune('0'+i)))
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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codes = append(codes, rr.Code)
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}
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allowed := 0
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for _, c := range codes {
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if c == 201 {
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allowed++
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}
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}
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if allowed > 5 {
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t.Fatalf("rotating XFF bypassed the limit: allowed=%d codes=%v", allowed, codes)
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}
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// and the no-header bucket is the SAME bucket: fully exhausted
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/pastes", bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{"content":"hi"}`)))
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req.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:51000"
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rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
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if rr.Code != 429 {
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t.Fatalf("no-header request after rotating XFF: want 429, got %d", rr.Code)
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}
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}
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// clientIP unit checks.
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func TestClientIPIgnoresClientHeadersByDefault(t *testing.T) {
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r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "198.51.100.5:51000"
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r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8")
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r.Header.Set("X-Real-Ip", "9.9.9.9")
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if got := clientIP(r); got != "198.51.100.5" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 198.51.100.5", got)
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}
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}
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// Opt-in trusted header: honored only from a trusted private peer and only
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// with a parseable IP value.
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func TestClientIPTrustedHeaderFromPrivatePeer(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER", "Cf-Connecting-Ip")
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// reset the cached CIDR parse (sync.Once) for a clean run
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resetTrustedProxyCache(t)
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r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000" // in-cluster proxy hop
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r.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "203.0.113.42")
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if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.42" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.42", got)
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}
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// same header from a PUBLIC peer must be ignored (peer not trusted)
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r2 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r2.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.9:51000"
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r2.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "6.6.6.6")
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if got := clientIP(r2); got != "203.0.113.9" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 203.0.113.9 (untrusted peer)", got)
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}
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// garbage header value must be ignored
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r3 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r3.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
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r3.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "not-an-ip; 6.6.6.6")
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if got := clientIP(r3); got != "10.42.0.7" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 10.42.0.7 (bad header value)", got)
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}
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}
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// Custom trusted proxy CIDR list is honored.
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func TestClientIPCustomTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("PALETTE_CLIENT_IP_HEADER", "Cf-Connecting-Ip")
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t.Setenv("PALETTE_TRUSTED_PROXIES", "192.168.50.0/24")
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resetTrustedProxyCache(t)
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r := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "192.168.50.10:51000"
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r.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "203.0.113.77")
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if got := clientIP(r); got != "203.0.113.77" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want 203.0.113.77", got)
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}
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// outside the custom list
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r2 := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/", nil)
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r2.RemoteAddr = "10.42.0.7:51000"
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r2.Header.Set("Cf-Connecting-Ip", "203.0.113.77")
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if got := clientIP(r2); got != "10.42.0.7" {
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t.Fatalf("clientIP = %q, want peer 10.42.0.7 (outside custom trusted list)", got)
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}
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}
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// IPv6 peer without port must not be mangled.
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func TestHostOnly(t *testing.T) {
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cases := map[string]string{
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"198.51.100.5:51000": "198.51.100.5",
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"[2001:db8::1]:8080": "2001:db8::1",
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"198.51.100.5": "198.51.100.5",
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}
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for in, want := range cases {
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if got := hostOnly(in); got != want {
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t.Errorf("hostOnly(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
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}
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}
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}
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